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1 Introduction
The analysis of the reasons for formation and viability of financial intermediaries
has been subject to a large number of research papers during the last 25 years. In
particular the seminal works of Diamond (1984), Williamson (1986), and Krasa and
Villamil (1992) argued that banks as the most common kind of financial intermediary
exist due to their ability to exploit economies of scope in performing monitoring of
borrowers on behalf of lenders. In this regard banks collect funds from lenders which
they employ to finance a large number of borrowers. This, in turn, reduces average
costs of monitoring borrowers and in this way makes banks valuable institutions
from the lender’s point of view.
However, the assumption of risk neutral borrowers, banks, and lenders made in
these papers has often been criticized in the literature. In particular Hellwig (2000)
and Hellwig (2001) allow for risk aversion of borrowers and intermediaries as well
while lenders basically are considered risk neutral. In the light of the recent litera-
ture on firms’ behavior in risky situations these assumptions are quite reasonable.
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For example Froot et al. (1993) figure out that in general per se risk neutral firms
may behave as if they are risk averse in case of the existence of risky investment
opportunities for which outside finance is necessary. Their argument is based on
the observation of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf (1984) that
outside finance is more expensive to firms than internally generated funds. A similar
argument is presented in Froot and Stein (1998) in the context of the banking indus-
try. Furthermore, Pausch and Welzel (2002) show that even regulatory constraints
as suggested by the Basel Capital Accords make risk neutral banks to decide in a
risk averse way.
Nevertheless, Hellwig’s assumptions on his agents’ attitudes towards risk imply
that lenders behave less risk averse than banks and borrowers which is not that clear.
On the one hand, banks and borrowers (entrepreneurs) usually enjoy limited liability
when investment projects fail. That is, firms’ managers are not liable for the debts of
the firm with the full extent of their private wealth. Hence limited liability weakens
incentives of managers to care about risk of investment opportunities. (cf. Jensen
and Meckling, 1976, p. 331) Particularly in the case of banks a similar reasoning
can be applied: in addition to limited liability banks are well diversified in their
loan portfolios which may reduce their overall exposure to risk and in this way the
level of risk aversion. On the other hand, a typical lender has to be considered a
private person or private household with individual wealth based on a single source
of earned income. Moreover, compared to firms’ need of finance a lender’s funds
available for investment are small which prevents the latter from building a well
diversified portfolio of investment projects.
From the above arguments it seems obvious that lenders may behave more risk
averse than banks and borrowers which provides the starting point for the analysis
of the present paper. With ex post information asymmetry between borrowers and
lenders as well as allowing for different levels of reservation utilities of lenders – i.e.,
considering a kind of market supply for financial funds – we widen the scope of the
traditional analysis of beneficial financial intermediation to questions regarding the
optimal level of finance contracts concluded in the market. With viable financial
intermediation our model therefore allows to derive results regarding the optimal size
of a financial intermediary. A financial intermediary in this context is considered a
traditional bank taking deposits and issuing loans.
As Hellwig (2000, p. 720f) points out, with risk aversion in the model the argu-
ments using the large numbers arguments of Diamond (1984) are no longer feasible.
But in contrast to Hellwig (2000) who makes up a situation in which the law of large
number is still valid, we show that in the context of risk averse lenders the concept
of first order stochastic dominance can be applied to derive interesting results. In
particular, in addition to the effect figured out by Diamond (1984) and Williamson
(1986) that occurrence of a bank reduces lenders’ expected costs of monitoring the
borrower there appears a second effect in the present model. We show that a bank
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with a well diversified loan portfolio offers an investment opportunity to lenders
which they consider less risky than a single borrower’s investment project. As a
result, banks need to pay lower risk premia than single borrowers which, in turn,
makes financial intermediation a viable business. Moreover, in a financial market
without a bank there appears some kind of credit rationing as a result of borrowers’
optimal decision making. With the existence of a bank this problem may be reduced
and additional profits may be realized. Profits, however, are shared among banks
and lenders while borrowers still achieve their reservation utility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 sets up the model
and analyzes the equilibrium in the financial market without intermediation. Section
3 considers occurrence of a bank and derives the corresponding market equilibrium.
In section 4 the results of the previous sections are compared and the optimal size
of the bank in case of viability is determined. Section 6 concludes.
2 Base Model without Bank
Consider a one period setting which may be interpreted as a single representative
situation out of an infinitely sequence of equal decisions in a capital market. There
are two kinds of actors involved: i = 1, . . . , n borrowers each endowed with an
investment project for which one unit of outside finance is needed – in fact we
assume that borrowers do not have any own funds – and j = 1, . . . ,m lenders each
equipped with one unit of capital appropriations. Hence, for realizing her investment
project a borrower needs to contract with one lender. Moreover, let n <∞, m <∞
and n ≤ m, i.e. the numbers of borrowers and lenders are finite but sufficiently large
to treat them as (quasi) continuous and there exists enough capital in the market
to realize all investment projects.
Investment projects are identical and stochastically independent among borrow-
ers. In this regard let yi ∈ [0; y] represent the payoff of an arbitrary borrower i
and assume E(yi) > 1. At the beginning of the period – when financing contracts
may be negotiated – borrowers as well as lenders do not know the actual outcome
from the project at the end of the period. However, the probability distributions
– represented by density f(yi) and corresponding cumulative distribution function
(cdf) F (yi) – are common knowledge.
1 Nevertheless, at the end of the period under
consideration there appears information asymmetry since the borrowers are able to
observe the actual outcome from their respective investment projects while lenders
are not. The latter can find out the actual outcome only when spending some fixed
cost of c > 0, i.e. we are concerned with a situation of costly state verification.
1Note, due to the assumption of identical and stochastically independent investment projects
these functions are the same for every single project.
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So far the model of the present paper is quite similar to the set-ups used in
Diamond (1984), Williamson (1986), and Krasa and Villamil (1992). Differences,
however, appear with assumptions on the agents’ attitudes towards risk and lenders’
outside options to invest funds besides financial contracts.
As explained in the introduction it is reasonable considering lenders more risk
averse than borrowers. The most simple way to catch this in the model of the
present paper ist to assume that borrowers are risk neutral and lenders to behave
risk averse. Therefore the formers’ objective concerns expected profit from realizing
investment projects and the latters’ concern is in expected utilities of repayments
from financing contracts. In this regard all lenders evaluate payments with the
same strictly increasing and concave von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:
U(·) with U ′(·) > 0 and U ′′(·) < 0. In case of lenders and borrowers fail to negotiate
a financing contract, borrowers are not able to conduct the investment project and
realize a payoff of zero. The lenders, however, may invest their funds into an in-
vestment other than the borrowers’ projects which guarantees lender j a reservation
utility of URj ∈ [UR;UR] ∀ j with UR > 0. The intuition behind this assumption
is that lenders may have different sources of working income which grant them ac-
cess to heterogeneous alternative investments. As a result reservation utilities may
differ between lenders and altogether there exists a minimum (UR) and a maximum
(UR) level of reservation utility. Furthermore, borrowers do not know the reser-
vation utility of a certain lender j. They just now the distribution of reservation
utility represented by the density function g(URj) and the corresponding cumulative
distribution function G(URj).
If there does not exist a bank in the contracting situation just set up, borrowers
and lenders will have to directly negotiate financing contracts. Such contracts com-
mit lenders to pay out one unit of funds to borrowers at the beginning of the period.
Furthermore, borrowers agree to meet a repayment t(yi) at the end of the period
which may depend on the realization of the payoff of their investment project. Since
lenders can not observe the actual realization without cost, they have to rely on the
payoff the borrower claims to be realized. Hence both parties define a set S ⊂ [0; y]
which specifies all claimed payoffs for which lenders spend verification cost c and
observe the actual outcome of the investment project.
In the process of negotiation borrowers are assumed to enjoy all the bargaining
power. One may argue that due to the sufficiently large number of lenders they
are able to enter into a contract with the lender who accepts most favorable con-
ditions from the borrower’s point of view. However, since the level of reservation
utility of a certain lender is unknown to the borrower, she can only determine the
probability for a successful contractual agreement whereby this probability rises as
the contract provides more beneficial terms for the lender – this is a direct result
from the assumptions on the distribution of reservation utility. Moreover, due to the
asymmetry of information between contracting parties the contract to be met has
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to create incentives to the borrower to correctly report outcome of the investment
project.
Due to the assumptions of the model for the analysis to follow it is sufficient to
consider a representative pairing of any borrower i and any lender j and determine
the optimal terms of the contract they enter. The decision process as a whole can
be represented as three-stage game: on the first stage borrower i offers a financing
contract (t(yi), S) which maximizes her expected profit. Thereafter, on stage 2,
a lender decides whether to accept the contract which ist the case if and only if
the expected utility generated by the contract is at least the same as the lender’s
reservation utility URj. Since the borrower does not know the lender’s reservation
utility definitely, she can only determine probability for a successful contract. Stage
3 considers the borrower’s incentives for truthfully reporting ex post realized payoffs
from the project.
To solve this game we apply the concept of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
which can be found by using backward induction. (cf. Rasmusen, 1989, p. 85.)
That is, we start on stage 3 to determine the incentive compatible structure of the
contract. Afterwards we have a look at stage 2 to find out when a lender accepts the
contract offered. At the end stage one is solved and optimal terms of the financing
contract are determined.
As explained earlier, due to ex post asymmetric information between borrowers
and lenders with respect to the actual realization of the payoff from the investment
project, the borrower may have an incentive to claim another outcome in order to
reduce the repayment to the lender. Therefore the threat of the lender to monitor the
borrower is used to give the borrower incentives for truthfully reporting outcome of
the investment project. However, with fixed cost c this is exactly a situation of costly
state verification which has been first analyzed by Townsend (1979) and applied to
the borrower-lender relationship in Gale and Hellwig (1985). From these papers it
is well known that an incentive compatible financing contract needs to feature the
following repayment function depending on project outcome:
t(yi) =
 t0 ; yi ≥ t0t(yi) < t0 − c ; yi < t0 (1)
The interpretation is straight forward: the contracting parties agree on a constant
repayment t0 as long as the claimed outcome from the investment project is at least
at the same level. In this situation the lender does not perform any monitoring
activities. In case of the borrower’s claim not being able to pay t0 the lender spends
verification cost c, observes the actual realization and enforces the pre-specified re-
payment in this situation t(yi) – of course he will additionally try to cover c. It
is obvious that in the latter case repayment depends on actual yi since verification
provides the necessary information to lenders. But in the former case without moni-
toring lenders do not know the actual realization of yi and therefore will be paid the
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constant minimum repayment without verification which is t0. It should be noted
that due to the assumption that borrowers do not have any own funds, they are
able to repay t0 just as long as yi ≥ t0 holds.2 As a result repayment function (1)
represents the solution to stage 3 of the contracting game.
Turning now to stage 2 one has to find out, in which situations a lender accepts
a financing contract offered. In this regard it has been already mentioned that some
contract with a repayment function that conforms to equation (1) will be accepted
when the level of expected utility generated by this contract – denoted henceforth
EU([t(yi)]) – is at least the same as a lender’s reservation utility. Taking into account
the borrowers uncertainty with respect to a certain lender’s reservation utility the
probability for entering a contract is
Prob (URj ≤ EU([t(yi)])) = G (EU([t(yi)])) . (2)
From (2) it is obvious that increasing the expected utility from the financing contract
increases probability of successful contracting. Hence, equation (2) represents the
lender’s participation constraint in which the expected utility from the financing
contract can be written as
EU([t(yi)]) =
∫ t0
0
U(t(yi))dF (yi) + U(t0)(1− F (t0)).
Taking into account the results for stages 2 and 3 of the contracting game, one
can now state the borrower’s optimization problem to be solved at stage 1:
max
t(yi),t0
m
n
G (EU([t(yi)]))
[∫ t0
0
(
yi − t(yi)− c
)
dF (yi) +
∫ y
t0
(yi − t0) dF (yi)
]
(3)
s.t. EU([t(yi)]) =
∫ t0
0
U(t(yi))dF (yi) + U(t0)(1− F (t0)) (4)
t(yi) + c ≤ yi ∀ yi < t0 (5)
t(yi), t0 > 0.
Equation (3) states the borrower’s expected profit depending on uncertainty con-
cerning the payoff from the investment project as well as concerning the success of
negotiating a contract. With respect to the latter source of uncertainty it should be
noted thatG(EU([t(yi)])) marks the probability for a single financing contract. Since
there are m lenders the total number of contracts in the market is mG(EU([t(yi)])).
Moreover, there may be less borrowers than lenders (n ≤ m) which creates a proba-
bility for a successful contract in the market of m
n
G(EU([t(yi)])). Equation (4) is the
2Note, the assumption of risk aversion does not affect the incentive structure of the problem.
Therefore, the structure of the incentive compatible financing contract remains the same regardless
the contracting parties attitudes towards risk. (cf. Hellwig, 2001, p.719) See also Pausch (2003)
for a more formal proof of this result.
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well known expression to calculate the lender’s expected utility form the financing
contract. Relation (5) accounts for the assumption that borrowers do not have any
own funds. Therefore they can meet a repayment of at most yi, i.e. the actual re-
payment from the investment project. Of course, when optimally deciding on t(yi)
and t0 we only consider strictly positive values since with t(yi), t0 = 0 there would
not exist a financing contract that is beneficial to both, borrowers and lenders.
Applying the Kuhn-Tucker-Theorem one can now derive the first order necessary
conditions for the optimal financing contract between borrower and lender:
g (EU([t(yi)]))
[∫ t0
0
(
yi − t(yi)− c
)
dF (yi) +
∫ y
t0
(yi − t0) dF (yi)
]
=
=
G (EU([t(yi)])) f(yi) + µ
U ′
(
t(yi)
)
f(yi)
∀ yi < t0 (6)
g (EU([t(yi)]))
[∫ t0
0
(
yi − t(yi)− c
)
dF (yi) +
∫ y
t0
(yi − t0) dF (yi)
]
=
=
(1− F (t0))−
(
yi − t(yi)− c
)
f(t0)
U ′ (t0) (1− F (t0))−
(
U(t0)− U(t(t0))
)
f(t0)
G (EU([t(yi)])) (7)
yi − t(yi)− c ≥ 0 ; µ ≥ 0 ;
(
yi − t(yi)− c
)
µ = 0 ∀ yi < t0. (8)
Equations (6) and (7) specify the optimal repayment in case of verification by the
lender t(yi) and in case of no verification t0, respectively. Conditions (8) define any
situation when the borrower has to utilize all payoff from the investment project for
repayment to the lender.
Taking a closer look at the first order necessary conditions one can state and
prove
Proposition 1 An optimal financing contract between borrower and lender – in
case of coming about – exhibits the repayment function
t(yi) =

t0 if yi ≥ t0
yi − c if yi < t0
and creates a strictly positive expected profit for the borrower.
Proof: See the Appendix.
A comparison of the optimal contract above to the one derived by Gale and
Hellwig (1985) for the case of risk neutral lenders and borrowers shows that they
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are identical. That is, the optimal financing contract between risk neutral borrowers
and risk averse lenders is still a standard debt contract in the sense of Gale and
Hellwig.
However, having a closer look at the model of the present paper shows that
our result is much more general than those of Gale and Hellwig (1985). Note,
by allowing for different levels of lenders’ reservation utilities the standard debt
contract does not accomplish with certainty as long as it generates a given level of
expected utility. Rather a borrower has to trade-off that a higher expected utility
level from the contract increases the probability of its acceptance but also calls
for a higher repayment to lenders and hence reduces borrowers’ expected profits in
case of success. As a result borrowers will choose the repayment such that UR <
EU([t(yi)]) ≤ UR holds. That is, on the one hand the standard debt contract
will never generate a level of expected utility that is below the lenders’ minimum
reservation utility because in this situation the contract will not be accepted and the
borrower loses a positive expected profit. On the other hand the borrower should
not rise the expected utility of the contract beyond the maximum reservation utility
of lenders since this would only decrease her expected profit without increasing the
probability of success.
But with an optimal expected utility of the standard debt contract which is be-
tween the lenders’ minimum and maximum levels of reservation utility it is obvious
that there may be situations where some borrowers are not successful in acquiring
outside finance for their investment project. Therefore, the present model provides
another explanation for some kind of credit rationing in the market equilibrium.
However, when this kind of credit rationing happens depends on the specific char-
acterization of the probability distributions incorporated in the model.
3 Intermediation by a Bank
We now introduce a financial intermediary in form of a monopolistic bank into
the model. Despite the fact that the bank’s business is simply to take deposits
from lenders and issue loans to borrowers her situation is very similar to the one
of borrowers. The bank is assumed to behave risk neutral, i.e. maximizes expected
profit, and does not have any own funds. At the moment we neglect any costs of
operating the bank. Hence, to issue loans to the amount of k the bank needs to take
deposits to the amount d for which k ≤ d holds. However, since taking deposits is
costly to the bank the objective of cost minimization included in maximization of
the expected profit implies k = d.
Concerning the bank’s level of information it is assumed that on the one hand
she ist not able to observe the actual realizations the investment projects of her
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borrowers. To get this information the bank has to spend fixed cost c per borrower.3
On the other hand only the distribution of lenders’ reservation utilities is known to
the bank. As a result, for a certain lender she can just determine a probability
for accepting a offer for a deposit contract. The assumptions regarding borrowers’
investment projects and lenders’ reservation utilities remain the same. Of course
lenders are not able to observe the bank’s earnings from issuing loans without cost.
Thus, just like in the previous section they each have to spend fixed cost c to get
this information.
From the bank’s point of view due to the above assumptions borrowers and
lenders are identical each. Therefore deposits and loan contracts do not differ among
lenders and borrowers, respectively. As a result, when the probability to enter into a
deposit contracts with a lender is G(EU([tD(Yk)])) just like in the previous section,
the overall amount of deposits is mG(EU([tD(Yk)])). In this regard tD(Yk) denotes
the bank’s repayment to a single lender at the end of the period depending on revenue
per loan the bank earns in its loan business. The situation of contracting with
borrowers is quite similar. Since borrowers’ investment projects are identical, loan
contracts will be too. Hence, when the bank offers k loan contracts the probability
of a certain borrower to enter into one of these is k
n
.
Let tK(yi) denote a borrower’s repayment to the bank under any loan contract,
then the bank earns Y =
∑k
i=0 tK(yi) in its loan business. The bank’s revenue per
loan will then be denoted by Yk =
1
k
Y .
For the analysis of the viability of a bank we will proceed as follows: first we
determine a potential market equilibrium when there exists a bank. Thereafter we
compare equilibria with and without bank to derive conclusions on the role of a bank
in the present context. In this regard the determination of a market equilibrium
when there exists a bank can be modeled as a three-stage game very similar to
the one of the previous section: on the first stage the bank designs deposit and
loan contracts such that her expected profit gets maximized. Here we assume that
the bank enjoys all the bargaining power. However, designing optimal contracts
in the present situation includes two aspects. On the one hand the structure of
loan an deposit contracts has to be profit maximizing. That is, there mustn’t be
an opportunity to increase expected profit simply by modifying the shape of the
respective repayment functions. On the other hand the level of utility generated
by the contracts – and hence the level of repayment – has to be set optimally. To
decompose the two aspects we split stage one in two parts: stage 1a determines the
optimal level of repayments by choosing k = d. That is, the optimal decision on
the amount of loans – and hence by assumption the optimal amount of deposits –
implies an optimal decision on the probability of a certain lender to accept a deposit
3Note, verification cost c in this section are the same as the lenders’ verification cost c in the
previous section. Hence we assume that there is no systematic cost advantage in verification for
the bank.
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contract. In this regard the bank sets the optimal level of expected utility generated
from the deposit contract. In Stage 1b the bank chooses the structure of the loan
an deposit contract such that the optimal level of k = d from stage 1a is met at
minimal cost and with maximal revenues from loans. Then, on stage 2 lenders as
well as borrowers decide whether to enter into contracts with the bank or to stay
in the situation of direct contracting of the previous section. Stage 3 considers
incentives of the contracts for borrowers and bank to truthfully report outcomes
from investment projects and loan business, respectively, at the end of the period.
For solving the game the concept of the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium using
the technique of backward induction is applied, again. Therefore we start with stage
3 to analyze incentives and incentive compatibility of loan and deposit contracts.
Considering the former at first, one can observe an incentive problem which is well
known in the literature: risk neutral borrowers get outside finance to realize invest-
ment projects and observe the corresponding outcome. The risk neutral lender – i.e.
the bank in our model – can not observe the actual payoff of the project without in-
curring cost c to monitor the borrower. Hence as long as the bank does not monitor
the borrower will always claim that she can not repay anything because of the bad
performance of the project. This, however, is exactly the situation which has been
analyzed in Gale and Hellwig (1985) resulting in a contract which provides a fixed
payment – say tK0 – whenever the bank does not perform any monitoring activities
– i.e. yi ≥ tK0 ∀ i – and a outcome dependent repayment tK(yi) < tK0 − c in case
of verification taking place – i.e. yi < tK0 ∀ i.
In addition there appears a second incentive problem between the bank and its
lenders which is basically the same as the incentive problem of the former section.
The bank receives an outcome Yk per loan at the end of the period which is not
observable by lenders. Thus the bank may have an incentive to misreport on the
realized outcome as long as there is no verification by lenders. Since lenders are risk
averse and the bank behaves risk neutral, the arguments presented in the former
section are still valid. However, to derive the exact structure of deposit contracts
one needs to adjust arguments for the present situation: since deposit contracts are
identical for all lenders the bank’s repayment to lenders is all in all dtD(Yk) where
tD(Yk) denotes the repayment to any lender if the bank reports an outcome from
the loan business of Yk per loan. Due to the assumption that the bank does not
have any own funds, the bank can repay at most kYk – i.e. the total outcome of
granting loans. Tanking into account that d = k was assumed earlier, the bank’s
limited liability can be represented as
Yk ≥ tD(Yk).
Using these modifications the arguments of the previous section can be directly
applied to see that incentive compatibility of deposit contracts implies a constant
repayment of the bank – say tD0 – when there is no verification and an outcome de-
pendent repayment tD(Yk) ≤ tD0− c when there appears verification by the lenders.
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With summing up the above arguments one can state the incentive compatible
structure of loan and deposit contracts, respectively, as follows:
tK(yi) =
 tK0 ; yi ≥ tK0tK(yi) ; yi < tK0 and tD(Yk) =
 tD0 ; Yk ≥ tD0tD(Yk) ; Yk < tD0 . (9)
Having derived the results for stage 3 of the game we can now go on with an
analysis of stage 2. In this regard borrowers as well as lenders will accept the bank’s
loan and deposit contract if and only if both do not suffer a loss in expected profits
and utilities, respectively. From a borrower’s point of view this may be stated
formally as
k
n
[∫ tK0
0
(
yi − tK(yi)− c
)
dF (yi)−
∫ y
tK0
(yi − tK0) dF (yi)
]
≥ E(Πdirect). (10)
Note, relation (10) represents a borrower’s participation constraint where E(Πdirect)
denotes the expected profit a borrower realizes in case of entering into a direct
financing contract with a lender. In the previous section this expected profit was
shown to be strictly positive and is exogenous for the bank. Furthermore notice, that
the number of loan contracts offered (k) positively affects the borrower’s expected
profit since a higher level of k increases the probability of receiving a loan.
In the analysis of the previous section it was found out that with direct contract-
ing of borrowers and lenders there appears a certain optimal level t0 for the financing
contract. As a consequence lenders are offered contracts which generate a certain
level of expected utility EU(t0) and a certain probability of success of G(EU(t0)).
4
This, however may be considered the lenders’ alternative utility when rejecting the
bank’s deposit contract. Hence the bank’s deposit contracts have to generate at least
this level of expected utility which we will denote EUdirct in the following. Thus, the
following condition must hold to ensure participation of lenders:
G (EU([tD(Yk)])) ≥ G(EUdirect).
Moreover, when the bank decides to offer deposit contracts to the amount of d = k,
it defines the level of expected utility a deposit contract must generate at the same
time, i.e.
mG (EU([tD(Yk)])) = d
must hold where we have used the fact that multiplying the probability of success
G(·) by the total number of lenders m yields the total number of deposit contracts
in the market. Hence a lender’s participation constraint can be stated as follows:
G (EU([tD(Yk)])) =
d
m
≥ G (EUdirect) . (11)
4Note, from Proposition 1 it is obvious that the optimal financing contract is completely char-
acterized by the repayment without verification (t0) since in case of verification borrowers have to
hand over total project outcome to lenders.
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Note, this formulation of the lender’s participation constraint accomplishes for the
two-stage process in designing the optimal deposit contracts. In order to determine
the optimal structure of the contract – stage 1b – the first part of (11), i.e. the
equation, is relevant. For the analysis of the optimal level of expected utility of the
deposit contract – stage 1a – the second part of (11), i.e. the inequation, has to be
used.
With the results derived so far, we are now able to have a closer look at stage
1b of the game which is concerned with the optimal structure of deposits and loan
contracts. In this regard assume that the bank has already chosen die optimal
amounts of deposits and loans d and k, respectively, which means that the lenders’
optimal level of expected utility has been already specified. Hence, to find the
optimal structure of deposits and loan contracts we have to find the solution of the
following maximization problem:
max
[tK(yi),tK0],[tD(Yk),tD0]
[∫ tK0
0
tK(yi)dF (yi)− tK0 (1− F (tK0))
]
−
−
[∫ tD0
0
(
tD(Yk) + c
)
dH(Yk)− tD0 (1−H(tD0))
]
(12)
s.t. G
(∫ tD0
0
U
(
tD(Yk)
)
dH(Yk) + U (tD0) (1−H(tD0))
)
=
d
m
(13)
k
n
[∫ tK0
0
(
yi − tK(yi)− c
)
dF (yi)−
∫ y
tK0
(yi − tK0) dF (yi)
]
≥ E (Πdirect) (14)
tD(Yk) + c ≤ Yk ∀ Yk < tD0 (15)
tK(yi) + c ≤ yi ∀ yi < tK0 (16)
tK(yi), tK0, tD(Yk), tD0 > 0.
Equation (12) represents the bank’s expected profit per unit of loan which it will
maximize by deciding on the details of deposit and loan contracts. Here the term
in first squared brackets is the expected outcome per unit of loan which is identical
for any single loan in the bank’s portfolio due to identical loan contracts to fund
identical investment projects. The second term in squared brackets displays the
bank’s expected cost per unit of loan, i.e. its expected repayment to lenders per
unit of loan. In computing this latter part of the bank’s expected profit we have
used the fact that repayment to lenders is based on average outcome Yk from the
loan portfolio and d = k. In this regard the function H(Yk) denotes the cumulative
distribution function of the random variable Yk. Moreover, we have used the fact
that Yk ∈ [0; tK0] since any loan contract can repay at least 0 due to the borrowers’
limited liability and at most tK0 due to incentive compatibility. As a result it must
be true that H(0) = 0 and H(tK0) = 1.
Conditions (13) and (14) represent the participation constraints of lenders and
borrowers, respectively. In (13) we used the arguments above and the consideration
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with respect to the probability distribution H(Yk) to state the lender’s expected
utility from a deposit contract as follows:
EU([tD(Yk)]) =
∫ tD0
0
U
(
tD(Yk)
)
dH(Yk) + U (tD0) (1−H(tD0)) .
The participation constraint of borrowers (14) has been already explained earlier.
Constraints (15) and (16) account for the part of considerations with respect to
incentive compatibility of deposit and loan contracts, respectively, which refer to
the sets of outcome when verification takes place. Note, the the remaining part
of incentive compatibility restraints has already been used in the formulation of
expected profits and utilities above. In addition, we assume that contract details are
strictly positive since optimal repayments of zero imply that lenders and borrowers
do not enter into deposit and loan contracts respectively. In this case, however, a
bank does not exist and there is no need to think about deposit and loan contracts.
Applying the Kuhn-Tucker-Theorem, one can now derive the first order necessary
conditions for the maximization problem above:
λKN +
µKN
k
n
f(yi)
=
1
k
n
∀ yi < tK0 (17)
λKN =
(
tK(tK0)− tK0
)
f(tK0) + (1− F (tK0))
k
n
(
(1− F (tK0))−
(
tK0 − tK(tK0)− c
)
f(tK0)
) (18)
λKG =
h(Yk) + µKG
g(EU(tD(Yk)))U ′
(
tD(Yk)
)
h(Yk)
∀ Yk < tD0 (19)
λKG =
(1−H(tD0))−
(
tD0 − tD(tD0)− c
)
h(tD0)
g(·)
(
U ′(tD0) (1−H(tD0))−
(
U(tD0)− U(tD(tD0))
)
h(tD0)
) (20)
G (EU([tD(Yk)]))− d
m
= 0 (21)
k
n
[E (Π([tK(yi)]))]− E(Πdirect) ≥ 0 ; λKG ≥ 0(
k
n
[E (Π([tK(yi)]))]− E(Πdirect)
)
λKG = 0 (22)
Yk − tD(Yk)− c ≥ 0 ; µKG ≥ 0(
Yk − tD(Yk)− c
)
µKG = 0 ∀ Yk < tD0 (23)
yi − tK(yi)− c ≥ 0 ; µKN ≥ 0(
yi − tK(yi)− c
)
µKN = 0 ∀ yi < tK0. (24)
Here, conditions (17) and (18) determine the optimal structure of the loan contract’s
repayment function tK(yi) and tK0, respectively, whereas (19) and (20) define the
Credit Risk, Credit Rationing and Banks 14
optimal structure of the repayment function of a deposit contract – i.e. tD(Yk) and
tD0, respectively. Conditions (21) and (22) or rather (23) and (24) represent the
Kuhn-Tucker-conditions for the lender’s and borrower’s participation constraints or
rather the lender’s and borrower’s incentive compatibility constraints, respectively.
In this regard λKG and λKN are the Lagrange-Multipliers for the lender’s and bor-
rower’s participation constraint and µKG and µKN are the Lagrange-Multipliers of
the lender’s and borrower’s incentive compatibility constraints, respectively. More-
over, h(Yk) represents the density function of the probability distribution of Yk which
corresponds to the cumulative distribution function H(Yk).
From the inspection of these first order necessary conditions we can now state
and prove our
Proposition 2 The optimal structure of both the bank’s deposit and loan contracts
is equivalent to the structure of standard debt contracts. That is, the optimal repay-
ment functions are
tD(Yk) =

tD0 ; Yk ≥ tD0
Yk − c ; Yk < tD0
and tK(yi) =

tK0 ; yi ≥ tK0
yi − c ; yi < tK0
,
respectively. In addition tK0 > tD0 holds.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The interpretation of this result is straightforward: the bank funds its granting
of loans by borrowing from lenders. Due to the kind of information asymmetry
on both sides of the bank’s business and the assumption of limited liability, the
optimal contracts have to provide incentives, too. These, however, are strongest
with standard debt contracts since then the respective borrower is taken away all
outcome from investment project or loan business, respectively. As a result, the
constant repayment when there is no verification by the respective lender can be
pushed to a minimum level which, in turn, reduces probability of verification and
therefore expected cost of verification to a minimal level, too. In this regard it is
necessary that the bank sets repayment from loan contracts tK0 above repayment to
lenders tD0 since the bank’s outcome per unit of loan has to cover at least expected
cost per unit of loan of monitoring borrowers in addition repayment to lenders. In
this way tK0 > tD0 is a necessary condition for a bank to be viable.
Moreover, in the proof of Proposition 2 it was argued that the borrower’s par-
ticipation constraint is binding in the optimum – i.e. λKN > 0. This result is
also obvious: since we assumed that the bank enjoys all the bargaining power in our
model, it will issue loan contracts which just ensure that borrowers will accept them.
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Therefore borrowers realize the same expected profit as with direct contracting with
lenders and the bank acquires all additional profits.
Before we can go on with the analysis of stage 1a it has to be recognized that on
the one hand deposit and loan contracts are completely characterized by repayments
tD0 and tK0, respectively. On the other hand, tD0 and tK0 still depend on the
size of the bank – i.e. on the total amount of loans granted k which we assumed
to be the same as the amount of deposits taken d. Thus, we have to find out
the interdependence between the level of repayment and the amount of loans (or
deposits) first.5
Consider first the effect of changing k on the optimal level of tK0. While having
argued so far that the first order necessary condition (18) determines the optimal
level of tK0 for the present part of the analysis the borrower’s participation constraint
(14) is considered. The reason is that during the derivation of the optimal structure
of the loan contract we found out this constraint to be binding and therefore if the
bank plans to increase the amount of loans granted it has to ensure that there is a
sufficient number of borrowers to enter into loan contracts. Therefore, we can state
an prove
Proposition 3 In the optimum the following relationship holds:
dtK0
dk
> 0.
Proof: Applying the implicit function theorem6 to the borrower’s participation
constraint (14) which binds in the optimum yields:
dtK0
dk
=
1
n
∫ y
tK0
(yi − tK0) dF (yi)
k
n
(1− F (tK0))
.
In this latter equation n > 0, k > 0 and 1−F (tK0) > 0 hold due to the assumptions
of the model. For the numerator one derives by applying standard manipulations
to (14): ∫ y
tK0
(yi − tK0) dF (yi) = n
k
E(Πdirect) > 0
where the inequality follows from E(Πdirect) > 0 as figured out in the proof of
Proposition 1. ¤
5In the following we focus on the relationship between k and tD0 as well as tK0 since with the
assumption d = k it is not necessary to perform a similar analysis with respect to d explicitly.
6See Chiang (1984, p. 208ff) for a detailed representation.
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The interpretation of Proposition 3 is evident: from the bank’s point of view it is
beneficial to offer more loan contracts if the price – i.e. the repayment – per contract
increases. However, one might ask why borrowers should be willing to accomplish
higher repayments when the bank offers a larger amount of loan contracts. The
reason is that increasing k increases a borrower’s probability of success for getting a
loan k
n
. As a result ceteris paribus a borrower’s expected profit rises. Since optimal
loan contracts are designed such that borrowers just realize E(Πdirect) the bank will
raise tK0 at the same time as long as borrowers still continue to accept loan contracts.
For the analysis of the relationship between tD0 and k we proceed analogously as
in the previous considerations. In this regard we have a closer look at the lender’s
participation constraint (13) since just like in the previous case this condition rep-
resents the binding restriction for the design of optimal deposit contracts. That is,
the repayment tD0 has to be determined such that the resulting level of expected
utility exactly ensures the desired amount of deposit and hence loan contracts to
accomplish. However, there are two effects which have to be taken into consideration
in this regard. First, increasing k requires increasing d by the same amount due to
the assumption k = d. The second effects appears with the distribution of average
outcome from the loan business Yk. When k is changed the number of loans which
contribute to the bank’s total revenue changes, too. This, in turn, may affect the
distribution of Yk where Yk ∈ [0; tK0] still holds. This latter effects has to be figured
out first before we can go on with the analysis.
Therefore we state and prove
Lemma 1 Increasing the amount of loans k yields first order stochastic dominance
in the distribution of Yk, formally:
d
dk
H(δ) ≤ 0 ∀ δ ∈ [0; tK0].
Proof: See the Appendix.
In fact, Lemma 1 is a formal representation of the portfolio-effect which appears
when a bank grants more than just a single loan. In this regard any additional
loan creates a non-negative extra revenue and hence raises the probability that the
average outcome from the loan portfolio takes on higher realizations with higher
probability. In other words: the risk of small repayments from the loan business
decreases on average as the amount of granted loans rises.
With the result of Lemma 1 we can now state and prove
Proposition 4 The effect of a change in the total amount of granted loans k on the
optimal repayment of deposit contracts tD0 is ambiguous.
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Proof: Applying the implicit function theorem to the lender’s participation con-
straint (13) yields
dtD0
dk
= −g(EU([tD(Yk)]))
(
∂
∂k
EU([tD(Yk)])
)− 1
m
g(EU([tD(Yk)]))
(
∂
∂tD0
EU([tD(Yk)])
) .
The denominator of this equation can be rewritten as
g(EU([tD(Yk)])) (U
′(tD0) (1−H(tD0))− (U(tD0)− U(tD0 − c))h(tD0))
which is equivalent to the denominator of the first order necessary condition (20)
which was shown to be strictly positive, earlier. Hence the sign of dtD0
dk
only depends
on the sign of the numerator.
Form the argument of first order stochastic dominance of Lemma 1, it is well
known in the literature that
∂
∂k
EU([tD(Yk)]) ≥ 0.7
As a result, since m > 0 and g(·) > 0 the sign of the numerator of the equation
above and hence the sign of dtD0
dk
is ambiguous. ¤
The interpretation of Proposition 4 is straightforward. If the bank raises the
amount of loans granted, it will simultaneously have to increase the amount of de-
posits taken. In this regard deposit contracts need to generate a level of expected
utility to lenders which ensures that the required number of lenders will enter into
deposit contracts. In this way the bank will have to raise tD0 – this is the inter-
pretation of the second part ( 1
m
) of the numerator in the equation for dtD0
dk
above.
However, at the same time there appears a further effect of increasing the amount
of loans which is a rise in the lenders’ expected utility due to the portfolio-effect of
Lemma 1. That is, granting more loans reduces the risk for lower levels of outcome
from the loan portfolio and in this way is considered beneficial from the lenders’
point of view. This effect is represented by ∂
∂k
EU([tD(Yk)]) in the equation for
dtD0
dk
above which is negative and, therefore, allows the bank to reduce tD0. In sum the
actual sign of dtD0
dk
depends of the relative strength of both effects. In case of a rela-
tively strong portfolio effect the bank may reduce the repayment to lenders whereas
otherwise the repayment has to increase.
Bearing in mind these results, one can now go on with the analysis of stage 1a of
the game, i.e. the optimal amounts of deposits and loans. For this purpose at first
reformulate the bank’s maximization problem as follows:
max
k
tK0(k)− tD0(k)−
∫ tK0(k)
tD0(k)
H(Yk)dYk (25)
s.t.
k
m
≥ G (EUdirect) . (26)
7See e.g. Wolfstetter (1999, p. 137f).
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In this regard (25) represents the bank’s expected profit in terms of Yk. That is, the
bank’s expected return per unit of loan from the loan portfolio – which was in (12)
given as the expected repayment from a single loan – may be alternatively written
as ∫ tK0
0
YkdH(Yk)
and applying the optimal structure of the deposit contract the expected repayment
to lenders can be rewritten as∫ tK0
0
tD(Yk)dH(Yk) =
∫ tD0
0
YkdH(Yk) + tD0 (1−H(tD0)) .
Integrating by parts both elements of the bank’s expected profit and rearranging
terms yields equation (25) which has a very nice interpretation: the bank’s expected
profit is equivalent to the spread between loan and deposit rates minus a kind of
risk premium payed to lenders.
Equation (26) is the lenders’ participation constraint. Note, lenders are willing to
enter into deposit contracts only if the corresponding level of expected utility is at
least the same as with direct contracting. In addition we have used the assumption
of k = d and the result of Propositions 3 and 4 from which both tK0 and tD0 are
affected by k. Moreover, due to G(EUdirect) > 0 which was shown to hold in the
previous section the participation constraint (26) ensures k > 0.
Once more applying the Kuhn-Tucker-theorem the following first order necessary
conditions for the maximization problem can be found:
dtD0
dk
(1−H(tD0)) +
∫ tK0
tD0
d
dk
H(YK)dYk =
1
m
ΛKG (27)
k
m
−G (EUdirect) ≥ 0 ; ΛKG ≥ 0 ;
(
k
m
−G (EUdirect)
)
ΛKG = 0. (28)
In this context (27) determines the optimal level of loans k and because of k =
d the optimal size of the bank. Conditions (28) are the Kuhn-Tucker-conditions
for the lenders’ participation constraint where ΛKG is the corresponding Lagrange-
Multiplier.
With first order necessary conditions (27) and (28) one can now state and prove
Proposition 5 If a bank enters the market the total number of loan and hence
deposit contracts as at least the same as with direct contracting of borrowers and
lenders.
Proof: From (28) it is obvious that ΛKG ≥ 0 must hold in the optimum. Hence
k = d ≥ mG (EUdirect)
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completes the proof since the right hand side of the inequality represents the total
number of directly negotiated financing contracts. ¤
It is not difficult to give an interpretation for this result. Lenders enter into
deposit contracts if and only if they realize at least the same level of expected
utility as with direct financing contracts. Thus, the probability of a single lender to
accept the bank’s offer is at least the same as with direct contracting resulting in
a minimum amount of deposits – and hence loans due to the assumption – defined
by the number of direct financing contracts. However, at a first glance this result is
not surprising but a further analysis derives the following interesting
Corollary 1 For a bank to be viable in the optimum an increase in the amount of
loans must not cause an decrease of tD0, i.e.
dtD0
dk
≥ 0.
Proof: Due to m > 0 and ΛKG ≥ 0 – see condition (28) – it follows from (27) that
dtD0
dk
(1−H(tD0)) ≥ −
∫ tK0
tD0
d
dk
H(Yk)dYk
must hold in the optimum. In this regard (1−H(tD0)) > 0 and ddkH(Yk) ≤ 0 – see
the proof of Lemma 1 – implies dtD0
dk
≥ 0 as a necessary condition for an optimal
bank size. ¤
To give an interpretation for Corollary 1 first note that changing tK0 does not
affect the bank’s expected profit – this is easily verified if one computes the derivative
of the expected profit with respect to tK0. But an increase of tD0 reduces the bank’s
expected utility since
d
dtD0
(
tK0 − tD0 −
∫ tK0
tD0
H(YK)dYk
)
= − (1−H(tD0)) ≤ 0
due to H(·) ∈ [0; 1]. Furthermore, from Propositions 3 and 4 the effect of a change
of k on tK0 and tD0, respectively, is obvious. In this regard rising k causes an
increase in tK0 which does not affect the bank’s expected profit – see arguments
above. However, as ∫ tK0
tD0
d
dk
H(Yk)dYk ≤ 0
indicates for any realization of Yk the corresponding value of H(Yk) is the smaller the
higher k. That is, the well known portfolio effect alters the probability distribution
of Yk. At the same time increasing k forces the bank to increase d which is included
Credit Risk, Credit Rationing and Banks 20
in dtD0
dk
. Therefore, if dtD0
dk
< 0 would be true the bank could go on increasing k
and in this way decrease tD0 and increase expected profit. Hence, this situation can
not be an optimum because then the impact of the portfolio effect on the bank’s
expected profit is not completely exploited. As a result the bank should increase k
as long as the portfolio effect is not outweighted by the effect which is based on the
necessary increase in expected utility of lenders to attract the optimal amount of
deposit contracts.
If in this situation the portfolio effect is very weak the lenders’ participation
constraint restricts tD0 downward. Thus one can observe, that the bank offers more
deposit and loan contracts if an only if the risk reducing effect of building up a loan
portfolio is sufficiently strong. Hence, even when there exists a bank in the market
the there may appear the same kind of credit rationing as with direct contracting
between borrowers and lenders.
4 The Role of Intermediation by a Bank
To derive conclusions regarding the role of a bank in the context of the contracting
situation between borrowers and lenders the present section studies if the bank can
improve total wealth in the financial market of the present model. For this purpose
optimal levels of expected profits and expected utilities derived in section 3 are
compared to the corresponding values of section 2.
With direct contracts between borrowers and lenders it was figured out that
borrowers realize an optimal an strictly positive level of expected profit E(Πdirect) >
0. At the same time lenders obtain a strictly positive level of expected utility
EUdirect > 0 from the direct financing contract. With financial intermediation by a
monopolistic bank it was found out that borrowers still realize the expected profit
E(Πdirect) > 0. Lenders, however realize a level of expected utility from deposit
contracts which is at least the same as with direct contracting EUdirect. That is,
depending on the bank’s decision on the optimal amount of loans and hence deposits,
lenders may even obtain a higher level of wealth. This is the case when the bank
issues loans to a larger amount than arise in the direct market. Therefore, from
the arguments of the previous sections borrowers as well as lenders obtain a level of
wealth when there exists a bank which is at least the same as with direct contracting.
As a consequence, whether there exists an welfare increasing effect of the entry
of a bank depends on its expected profit. In this regard we can state an prove
Proposition 6 The bank’s expected profit is strictly positive in the optimum.
Proof: Consider the representation of the bank’s profit in (25). From Proposition 2
it is already known that tK0 > tD0 in the optimum. Furthermore, due to H(tK0) >
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H(tD0) and H(tK0) = 1 the following relation holds:∫ tK0
tD0
H(Yk)dYk < (tK0 − tD0)H(tK0) = tK0 − tD0.
Hence, in the optimum it must be true that
tK0 − tD0 −
∫ tK0
tD0
H(Yk)dYk > 0.
¤
As a result one can observe that the appearance of a bank which collects funds
from lenders and grants loans to borrowers increases the welfare in the financial
market of the present model.
Moreover, the existence of a bank may even weaken the problem of credit ra-
tioning. From the arguments above one can observe that the minimum level of
bank’s deposit and loan contracts is the same as the total amount of directly nego-
tiated financing contracts; i.e.
kmin = dmin = mG (EUdirect) .
In this case loan contracts and direct financing contracts exhibit exactly the same
repayments for borrowers. Furthermore, lenders will receive a level of expected util-
ity of G(EUdirect) regardless of direct contracting or entering into deposit contracts.
The difference between direct financing and deposit contracts is that t0 = tK0 > tD0
holds which is possible because the bank is able to reduce the risk of financing bor-
rowers’ investment projects by building a large scale loan portfolio. However, in
this case there still may appear credit rationing to the same amount as with direct
contracting since profits from tK0 > tD0 completely remain with the bank.
But when the bank decides to fund a larger number of investment projects than
would be the case with direct contracting – i.e. if k > kmin – credit rationing would
be reduced. Note, in Proposition 3 it was figured out that borrowers willingness to
pay for a loan increases if the bank offers a larger amount of loans. The monopolistic
bank exploits this effect by leaving the borrowers at E(Πdirect). As a result, the
bank’s expected profits increase. However, in order to issue loans at the amount
k > kmin it is necessary to raise the total amount of deposits, too, such that k = d
still holds. For this purpose, the bank has to design deposit contracts in a way that
resulting expected utilities for lenders are increased until mG(EU([tD(Yk)])) = d.
Therefore, it is obvious that on the one hand in the optimum borrowers are willing
to pay for a reduction of credit rationing which increases the bank’s expected profit.
On the other hand, however, the bank has to hand over parts of the additional profit
from reducing credit rationing to lenders since at the end they have to be willing
to carry the lower level of credit rationing. In this way they are payed an adequate
compensation.
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5 Conclusion
Recent literature on the theory of financial intermediation has figured out some
important reasons for banks being valuable institution. The delegated monitoring
argument of Diamond (1984), Williamson (1986), and Krasa and Villamil (1992) may
be considered as the most important one in this regard. But while this argument is
based on a cost advantage of banks in monitoring borrowers derived from the law of
large numbers, the model of the present paper figures out another important reason
for explaining the role of banks.
In a financial market with risk neutral borrowers who wish to realize risky in-
vestment projects using external finance and risk averse lenders who wish to invest
funds, borrowers and lenders enter into direct financing contracts. These contracts
solve both, the problem of ex post information asymmetry of lenders who are not
able to observe the outcome of the borrowers’ investment projects without cost and
the borrowers information problem not to know a single lender’s reservation utility.
Therefore, borrowers have to trade off two effects: at first offering lenders a higher
repayment increases the probability of the contract being accepted. But, at second,
this reduces borrowers’ expected profit. Therefore borrowers choose contracts with
a strictly positive probability of being rejected by lenders. As a result, there appears
some degree of credit rationing as a consequence of the borrowers’ optimal decision
making.
The appearance of a bank in this context undoubtedly enhances total welfare in
the market, since borrowers as well as lenders enjoy at least the same level utility
compared to the situation of direct contracting. The reason is that using the instru-
ment of deposit contracts banks collect funds of a large number of lenders and are, in
turn, able to grant a large number of loans to borrowers. In this way there appears
a portfolio effect in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. That is, pooling
a large number of identical independent risks – in particular risk regarding the re-
payments from borrowers investment projects – increases the bank’s probability to
realize higher levels of repayment from the loan business. From the lenders’ point
of view the investment activities of the bank are less risky than direct contracting
with borrowers. As a result, the bank is able to impose a strictly positive spread
between repayments from loan contracts and repayments to lenders as long as the
portfolio effect is sufficiently strong. Moreover, with a strong portfolio effect the
bank may also reduce the problem of credit rationing since then it may be optimal
to fund a larger number of investment projects than would be the case in the direct
market. However, the additional profit then has to be shared with lenders in order
to acquire the sufficient amount of deposits in this situation.
Of course, one may argue that there are some assumptions in the model which
appear not very realistic. For example usually there are more than a single bank in
the market competing for borrowers and lenders. However, this does not affect the
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main arguments of the present model. Just the allocation of wealth among borrow-
ers, bank, and lenders is changed in this situation. The assumption of borrowers’
identical ivestment projects is not as crucial as it may appear at the first glance.
The argument of first order stochastic dominance still holds with different invest-
ment projects even when they are positively correlated. Of course, in the latter
case the portfolio effect would be weakened and in this way operating a bank would
be more complicated. But altogether the qualitative results of the present model
appear quite robust against modifications in basic assumptions.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider equation (6) first. Due to f(y) > 0 ∀ yi ∈ [0; y], µ ≥ 0 because of the
Kuhn-Tucker-Conditions (8), U ′(·) > 0 and G(EU([t(yi)])) ≥ 0 the right hand side of
(6) is definitely non-negative. However, having a closer look at this term shows that
it may equal zero if and only if G(EU([t(yi)])) = 0 and µ = 0 hold simultaneously.
But G(EU([t(yi)])) = 0 implies that the contract offered will never be accepted by a
lender and as a result one needs not care about the repayment function in particular.
Therefore, for a finance contract to be accepted in the optimum it must be true that
G(EU([t(yi)])) > 0 and hence
G(EU([t(yi)]))f(yi) + µ
U ′(t(yi))f(yi)
> 0 ∀ yi < t0.
Thus, for (6) to hold the left hand side of this condition has to be strictly positive,
too. Because of g(·) > 0 – by definition a feature of the density function of any
random variable – this is the case if∫ t0
0
(
yi − t(yi)− c
)
dF (yi) +
∫ y
t0
(yi − t0) dF (yi) > 0.
But this latter term is exactly the borrower’s expected profit provided the financing
contract accomplishes which proves the second part of the proposition.
To prove the first part of Proposition 1 we now take a look at equation (7). Note,
the term on the left hand side of (7) is the same as the term on the left hand side of
(6) which has to be strictly positive in the optimum. Hence the term on the right
hand side of (7) has to be also positive in the optimum, of course. However, as
explained earlier, incentive compatibility of the financing contract demands t0 to be
a constant. As a result, the right hand side of (7) does not change when yi changes.
With this result it is obvious that for the right hand side of (6) it must be true that
G(EU([t(yi)]))f(yi) + µ
U ′(t(yi))f(yi)
= const. ∀ yi < t0.
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This, however, can hold if and only if µ > 0. Otherwise, i.e. with µ = 0, optimality
would require
G(EU([t(yi)]))
U ′(t(yi))
= const. ∀ yi < t0.
Due to G(·) > 0 in the optimum (see arguments above) and U ′′(·) < 0 by assumption
this would imply
t(yi) = const. ∀ yi < t0.
But this is impossible because by assumption a borrower can pay at most yi to the
lender since he does not have any own funds in addition to the payoff from the
investment project. That is, a constant repayment in case of yi < t0 would have to
be zero which hurts incentive compatibility of the financing contract.8
At the end µ > 0 must be true in the optimum which implies – see the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions (8) – the following repayment of the borrower in case of verification
to the lender:
t(yi) = yi − c ∀ yi < t0.
¤
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the optimal structure of the deposit contract first. Since the situation is
generally the same as with direct contracting of borrowers and lender, one can apply
the arguments of the proof of Proposition 1 in perfect analogy to conditions (19) and
(20): due to U ′(·) > 0, h(·) > 0 – which is a feature of probability density functions
– and µKG ≥ 0 – which follows from the Kuhn-Tucker-Theorem it must be true
from (19) that λKG > 0. In addition from (20) one can observe λKG = const. ∀Yk
because of tD0 being constant, too. Therefore, since U
′′(·) < 0 condition (19) holds
if and only if
tD(Yk) = Yk − c ∀ Yk < tD0
which completes the proof of the first part of the proposition.
To prove the second part of Proposition 2 – i.e. the optimal structure of loan
contracts – we have a look at the corresponding first order necessary conditions
(17) and (18). In this regard inserting (18) into (17) and applying some standard
manipulations yields
µKN
(1− F (tK0))−
(
tK0 − tK(tK0)− c
)
f(tK0)
f(yi)
= cf(tK0)
from which it is obvious that the right hand side of this latter equation is strictly
positive since c > 0 and f(·) > 0. Therefore, the left hand side has to be positive,
8See Pausch (2003) for a detailed discussion of this argument.
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too. Moreover from the Kuhn-Tucker-condition (24) it is apparent that µKN ≥ 0
which requires that the numerator of the fraction on the left side of this equation is
positive, too – i.e.
(1− F (tK0))−
(
tK0 − tK(tK0)− c
)
f(tK0) > 0.
Hence for the optimal structure of the loan contract the following must hold:
tK(yi) = yi − c ∀ yi < tK0.
In addition, using the observation that the above expression is strictly positive in
the optimum, one can show the borrower’s participation constraint to be binding –
i.e. λKN > 0. For this purpose note that the expression above is the same as the
denominator on the right hand side of equation (18) except k
n
> 0. Furthermore,
due to c > 0 it follows from the above relation that
(1− F (tK0))−
(
tK0 − tK(tK0)
)
f(tK0) =
(
tK(tK0)− tK0
)
f(tK0)+(1− F (tK0)) > 0
which is exactly the numerator of (18).
For the proof of the third part of the proposition rewrite the first order necessary
condition (20) using the results derived so far to yield
λKG =
1−H(tD0)
g(EU(·)) (U ′ (tD0) (1−H(tD0))− (U(tD0)− U(tD0 − c))h(tD0)) .
From our earlier arguments it is already known that λKG > 0. If tD0 ≥ tK0 would
be true in the optimum, we would find 1 − H(tD0) = 0 since Yk ∈ [0; tK0]. Hence,
the bank can at most repay tD = tK0 to lenders and tD0 will be payed at no time.
Furthermore, due to U ′(·) > 0 , c > 0 and h(·) > 0 the denominator would be
strictly negative in this case. As a result we find λKG = 0 in this situation which
contradicts our observation that λKG > 0 in the optimum. Hence, in the optimum
tK0 > tD0 must hold. ¤
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the bank’s total outcome from the loan business Y =
∑k
i=1 tK(yi) where
tK(yi) are the borrowers’ repayment functions which are identical due to identical
and independent distributed random variables yi. As a result all tK(yi) are identical
and independent distributed, too. Let in the following fK(tK(yi)) denote the proba-
bility density function of any repayment function tK(yi) and H(γ|k) the probability
of Y ≤ γ for a given amount of loans k which can be computed as follows9:
H(γ|k) =
∫ tK0
0
fK(tK(y1)) . . .
∫ γ−∑k−1i=1 tK(yi)
0
fK(tK(yk))dtK(yk) . . . dtK(y1)
9See Larsen and Marx (1986, p. 142f).
Credit Risk, Credit Rationing and Banks 26
where stochastic independence of the single borrower’s repayments has been used.
The same can be done with respect to the probability of Y ≤ γ when k+1 loans
are granted:
H(γ|k + 1) =
∫ tK0
0
fK(tK(y1)) . . . ·
·
∫ γ−∑k−1i=1 tK(yi)
0
fK(tK(yk))
∫ γ−∑ki=1 tK(yi)
0
fK(tK(yk+1)) ·
·dtK(yk+1)dtK(yk) . . . dtK(y1).
Note, this latter expression differs from the former one only by the term∫ γ−∑ki=1 tK(yi)
0
fK(tK(yk+1))dtK(yk+1) = FK
(
γ −
k∑
i=1
tK(yi)
)
∈ [0; 1].
Hence it must be true that
H(γ|k + 1) ≤ H(γ|k) ∀ γ.
If one considers that by definition Yk =
1
k
Y holds, this result can be transfered
to the probability distribution of Yk. For this purpose we write
10:
H(γ|k) = P (Y ≤ γ|k) = P (1
k
Y ≤ 1
k
γ|k) = P (Yk ≤ 1
k
γ|k) = H(1
k
γ|k).
Now, define 1
k
γ = δ and assume that k is sufficiently large, then the above relation
can be rewritten as
d
dk
H(δ) ≤ 0 ∀ δ ∈ [0; tK0]
which is a representation of first order stochastic dominance.11 ¤
10See Larsen and Marx (1986, p. 134).
11See e.g. Wolfstetter (1999, p. 136f.).
Credit Risk, Credit Rationing and Banks 27
References
Chiang, A. C. (1984), Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics , Auckland,
Hamburg, London: McGraw–Hill.
Diamond, D. (1984), Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring , Review
of Economic Studies 51, 393–414.
Froot, K., D. Scharfstein, and J. Stein (1993), Risk Management: Coordinating
Corporate Investment and Financing Policies , Journal of Finance 48, 1629–1658.
Froot, K. and J. Stein (1998), Risk Management, Capital Budgeting, and Capital
Structure for Financial Institutions: An Integrated Approach, Journal of Financial
Economics 47, 55–82.
Gale, D. and M. Hellwig (1985), Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-
Period Problem, Review of Economic Studies 52, 647–663.
Hellwig, M. (2000), Financial Intermediation with Risk Aversion, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 67, 719–742.
Hellwig, M. F. (2001), Risk Aversion and Incentive Compatibility with Ex Post In-
formation Asymmetry , Economic Theory 18, 415–438.
Jensen, M. C. andW. H. Meckling (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–
360.
Krasa, S. and A. P. Villamil (1992), Monitoring the Monitor: An Incentive Structure
for a Financial Intermediary , Journal of Economic Theory 57, 197–221.
Larsen, R. J. and M. L. Marx (1986), An Introduction to Mathematical Statistics
and Its Applications , Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2. edn.
Myers, S. C. and N. S. Majluf (1984), Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, Journal of Financial
Economics 13, 187–221.
Pausch, T. (2003), The Lender-Borrower Relationship with Risk Averse Lenders ,
Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe, Beitrag Nr. 244, Institut fu¨r Volk-
swirtschaftslehre, Universita¨t Augsburg.
Pausch, T. and P. Welzel (2002), Credit Risk and the Role of Capital Adequacy
Regulation, Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe, Beitrag Nr. 224, Institut fu¨r
Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universita¨t Augsburg.
Rasmusen, E. (1989), Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory ,
Oxford, New York: Blackwell.
Credit Risk, Credit Rationing and Banks 28
Townsend, R. M. (1979), Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly
State Verification, Journal of Economic Theory 21, 265–293.
Williamson, S. D. (1986), Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equi-
librium Credit Rationing , Journal of Monetary Economics 18, 159–179.
Wolfstetter, E. (1999), Topics in Microecomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions,
and Incentives , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
————————————
